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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 10-3420 
_________________ 
 
ZHI ZHAO, 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                               Respondent 
_________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A078-015-958) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald Ferlise 
_________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 13, 2011 
 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 21, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Zhi Zhao, a citizen of the People‟s Republic of China, seeks review of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ (“BIA”) decision denying her motion to reopen 
proceedings.  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 In August 2002, Zhao was charged with removability for entering the United 
States without valid entry documents.  At her 2004 removal proceedings, Zhao conceded 
that she was removable but filed an application for asylum and related relief claiming that 
she was persecuted under China‟s family planning policy by, among other things, being 
forced to have an abortion.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) made an adverse credibility 
finding and denied relief.  He also found that Zhao had filed a frivolous application.  On 
March 23, 2006, the BIA affirmed the IJ‟s decision without opinion.  
 In October 2008, Zhao filed a motion to reopen alleging a well-founded fear of 
future persecution due to changed country conditions in China.  She asserted that she 
would be sterilized if removed to China because she had given birth to a child in the 
United States and was pregnant with a second child.  The BIA determined that Zhao had 
not established changed country conditions, and denied the motion to reopen as untimely.  
This Court then granted Zhao‟s petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA 
after determining that it had failed to adequately explain its reasoning for rejecting the 
evidence that Zhao submitted in support of her motion.  (C.A. No. 09-1392.)  
 On remand, Zhao offered additional evidence, including a supplemental statement, 
her second child‟s birth certificate, a 2009 letter from her parents, a document from the 
Shouzhan Town Birth Control Office notifying her that she is to be sterilized upon her 
return to China, information from the Fujian Province Population and Family Planning 
Commission, and various background reports.  She also asserted, for the first time, that 
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she received ineffective assistance of counsel during her initial appeal to the BIA because 
her attorney did not challenge the IJ‟s finding of frivolousness.   
 On July 19, 2010, the BIA again denied Zhao‟s motion to reopen.  After 
concluding that Zhao did not meet the requirements for bringing a claim of ineffective 
assistance of  counsel, it determined that she “failed to offer sufficient persuasive, 
probative, and authenticated evidence to establish a change in circumstances or country 
conditions „arising in the country of nationality‟ so as to create an exception to the time 
and number limitation for filing a late motion to reopen to apply for asylum.”   
 Zhao, proceeding pro se, now petitions for review of the BIA‟s final order of 
removal.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA‟s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a), and review a decision denying a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  Guo 
v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004).  “As a general rule, motions to reopen are 
granted only under compelling circumstances.”  Id. at 561.  
 Motions to reopen must be filed with the BIA no later than 90 days after the date 
of the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be opened.  8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  However, this limitation does not apply if the movant seeks reopening 
“based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such 
evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or 
presented at the previous hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 
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 An ineffective assistance of counsel claim can also toll the statute of limitations 
for filing a motion to reopen.  Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 251-52 (3d Cir. 
2005).  To meet the procedural requirements for bringing such a claim, a petitioner must 
submit: (1) an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts; (2) evidence that former counsel 
was informed of the allegations and allowed a chance to respond; and (3) a statement that 
a complaint against counsel has been filed with the appropriate disciplinary authority, and 
if not, a reasonable explanation of why not.  In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 
1988); see also Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that the 
Lozada requirements are reasonable).  Further, to qualify for equitable tolling, the 
petitioner must exercise due diligence in raising the claim.  Mahmood, 427 F.3d at 252. 
 Zhao asserted that her attorney was ineffective because he failed to challenge the 
IJ‟s conclusion that her asylum application was frivolous.  In an attempt to comply with 
the Lozada requirements, she submitted a statement regarding her attorney‟s alleged 
ineffective assistance, a March 2010 complaint that she filed with the New York attorney 
disciplinary committee, and a certified mail receipt indicating that she sent the 
disciplinary complaint to her former counsel.  The BIA determined that Zhao did not 
meet the Lozada requirements because she neither informed her counsel of the allegations 
against him nor did she give him a chance to respond to the allegations.  It also  
concluded that, even had she met the procedural requirements, she did not demonstrate 
that she exercised due diligence in raising her claim.     
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 We agree that Zhao did not exhibit due diligence in filing her ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  Zhao claims that she did not know that her attorney failed to 
challenge the frivolousness finding until she received this Court‟s 2009 decision. 
However, she has failed to provide any evidence that she acted with diligence.  Assuming 
her stated reason for the late filing is correct, then she took no steps to inquire about her 
removal proceedings from 2004, when she hired an attorney to file her appeal before the 
BIA, until this Court issued a decision in 2009.  This does not constitute diligence.  
Accordingly, the BIA‟s decision regarding Zhao‟s claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is not arbitrary or contrary to law.  See Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 311 
(3d Cir. 2007) (reciting standard for reviewing a denial of a motion to reopen). 
 The BIA also did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Zhao‟s claim that the 90-day 
limit for filing a motion to reopen should be excused due to changed country conditions.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  Zhao first contends that the BIA improperly 
discounted the evidentiary value of the documents that she submitted in support of her 
motion to reopen.  See Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(remanding where the BIA failed to consider evidence that was both material and 
previously unavailable).  Zhao is correct that a failure to authenticate documents under 8 
C.F.R. § 287.6 does not warrant per se exclusion, and that a petitioner is permitted to 
prove authenticity by other means.  See Liu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 2004). 
However, because Zhao did not authenticate the documents in any manner, the BIA 
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“properly discounted” them.  See Chen v. Att’y Gen., No. 09-3459, 2011 WL 923353, at 
*4 (3d Cir. Mar. 18, 2011).   
 We agree with Zhao that it was improper for the BIA to have taken into account 
the IJ‟s adverse credibility assessment when considering what weight to give her newly 
filed documents, as the credibility determination was unrelated to the claim in her motion 
to reopen.  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d at 562.  This does not, however, warrant a grant 
of the petition for review because the BIA also specifically considered the newly filed 
documents and found them to be lacking in probative value for other valid reasons.  The 
BIA also considered the substance of “the statement[s] from family and friends,” and 
noted that they did not “demonstrate[] a material change in the application of the family 
planning policy in their local village since the date of the last hearing in 2004.”  Further, 
as explained below, the BIA appropriately based its ultimate conclusion on the finding 
that it was unreasonable for Zhao to fear forced sterilization upon her return to China.  
See Shardar, 503 F.3d at 312 (noting that a petitioner must establish a prima facie case 
for asylum to succeed on a motion to reopen).   
 Zhao‟s motion to reopen is based on her fear of being sterilized for having had two 
children in the United States in violation of China‟s family planning policy.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42) (providing that forced sterilization constitutes persecution on account of 
political opinion).  The BIA determined that the independent record, including the 2007 
U.S. State Department Country Report, does not reflect that forced sterilization is used to 
enforce the family planning policy in Fujian Province.  See In re S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
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247, 257 (BIA 2007) (noting distinction between documents reflecting a policy of 
mandatory sterilization and mandatory forcible sterilization and explaining that refugee 
status extends only to the latter); In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 214 (BIA 
2010) (noting discussion in 2007 Report that there have been no cases of forced 
sterilization in Fujian Province in ten years).
1
  The BIA acknowledged that Zhao‟s 
evidence indicated that children born abroad, whose parents are both Chinese nationals 
who have not settled in another country, are regarded as foreign nationals.  Relying on 
the 2007 Country Report and In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, it nonetheless concluded that this 
was not dispositive of whether Zhao would face forcible sterilization.  As in Chen, this is 
not a situation where the BIA “ignore[d] [the petitioner‟s] evidence or fail[ed] to conduct 
a case-specific analysis of the evidence.”  2011 WL 923353, at *3.  We thus agree with 
the BIA that “the record supports the finding that [Zhao] does not have a well-founded 
fear” of forcible sterilization.”  See id.  Accordingly, we will not disturb the BIA‟s 
finding that Zhao failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum. 
 In sum, we conclude the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhao‟s 
motion to reopen.  We will therefore deny her petition for review. 
 
                                              
1
 Additionally, the BIA properly rejected Zhao‟s assertion that she was eligible to 
file a successive asylum application based on changed personal circumstances.  See Liu v. 
Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that successive asylum applications 
based on changed personal circumstances are permitted only within the 90-day reopening 
period).   
